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THE CAPITAL MARGIN CONCEPT
AND THE WYOMING CORPORATION LAW
E.

GEORGE RUDOLPH*

It has recently been suggested that corporation statutes must affirmatively provide for authorized procedures and devices in considerable
detail because of the negative attitude demonstrated by courts in holding
various innovations in corporate organization illegal in the absence of
express statutory authorization, 1 Whether this judicial attitude results
from a basic mistrust of corporations, or whether it is merely the inevitable
result of the inadequacy of conventional contract or agency law to take
care of the needs of corporations, we need not pause to consider. In any
event most modern corporation statutes contain rather complete provisions
concerning forms of organization and reorganization and permissible
activity in the conduct of the corporation's business and the management
of its internal affairs. In this respect the Wyoming Statute, by comparison
with others, seems inadequate to meet the needs of the corporation and its
legal advisor. This deficiency is most serious in the area of corporate
finance and especially, with respect to the stockholders' investment.
Before discussing the particular problems arising in this field it seems
desirable, even at the risk of being overly elementary, to restate in general
terms the capital margin theory.2 Originally all stock was par value stock,
and a corporation could begin business only after its entire authorized
stock had been issued and payment for it received. Under this state of
the law the capital figure in the charter or articles of incorporation represented a required total of net assets at the outset of corporate existence,
and it could logically be suggested that this margin was intended for the
protection of the corporation's creditors, serving as a substitute for the
personal liability of the proprietors. From this it followed that the corporation's net assets could not be reduced below this amount by distributions to shareholders while the corporation continued in business. Of
course, the assets might be so reduced involuntarily through unfavorable
business operations, and in that event the stockholders would not be
required to restore the margin since that would be inconsistent with the
theory of limited liability. Two rather early innovations in the general
corporation statutes pretty well destroyed this capital margin concept in
its original form. The first of these was the elimination of the requirement that all or any substantial part of the capital stock must be paid in
as a condition precedent to doing business, and the second was the authoriza*
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tion of no par stock. Thus a corporation no longer needs to be provided
with any original minimum of net assets, nor does each share of stock
represent a definite and uniform contribution to such assets. Most modern
corporation statutes none-the-less contain rather elaborate provisions retaining the capital margin theory so far as it can be made consistent with
these other propositions. It is in such provisions that the Wyoming Statute
is so notably lacking.
It shall be the plan of this paper to compare the Wyoming Statute
with others, in particular the Model Business Corporation Act, on the
questions and then to determine if the gaps and omissions which appear
in the Wyoming Statute can be filled by reference to case law, or whether,
on particular questions, the silence of the statute itself affords an answer,
and finally in this way to determine the irreducible minimum of unanswerable questions under the present Wyoming law.
CREATION OF THE CAPITAL MARGIN

The Model Act provides that shares having a par value shall be issued
for such consideration, not less than the par value, as shall be fixed by the
directors, and shares without par value shall be issued at such consideration
as may be fixed by the directors from time to time unless the right to fix
such consideration is reserved to the shareholders by the Articles of Incorporation.3 The Act then provides that on the issuance of par value shares
"stated capital" shall be increased by the par value of such shares, and the
consideration over and above the par value, if any, received for such shares
shall be credited to "capital surplus." On the issuance of shares without
par value the entire consideration received is to be credited to "stated
capital" except that the directors may credit not more than twenty-five per
4
cent of such consideration to "capital surplus."
Leaving aside for the moment the significance of "stated capital" and
"capital surplus," the only legal requirement in the above provisions would
seem to be that par value shares must be issued for a consideration not less
than par. While the Wyoming statute contains no similar requirement,
the omission is probably not fatal to the proposition. In the first place,
such a rule seems to be assumed by the provision of Section 44-1265 authorizing the directors to issue stock for property "to the amount of the value
thereof" and providing that such stock shall be fully paid and nonassessable. Secondly, the requirement for the payment of full par value
has most often been invoked to hold shareholders of an insolvent corporation liable to the corporation's creditors for the difference between the price
they paid for their shares and the par value of such shares. For the purpose
of such liability an express statutory requirement for the payment of full
3. The Model Business Corporation Act, Section 17. The Act has been published as
Vol. VI, No. I of The Business Lawyer.
4. Ibid. Section 19.
5. References throughout the paper to statutory sections shall be to Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 1945, unless otherwise noted.
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par is probably not necessary, since the liability is generally predicated on
either the "trust fund theory" or the "fraud theory," the former purportedly
6
being grounded in equity and the latter in the common law. Futhermore,
there would seem to be no purpose served by the statute making any pro7
vision for par value shares unless some such liability was intended.
However, doubt may be cast on the validity of this conclusion under
the Wyoming law by a reference to legislative history. At one time the
Wyoming statute did contain an express provision imposing such a liability
on shareholders in favor of the corporation's creditors.8 This provision
was eliminated by the amendment of 19399 and, of course, it can be argued
with considerable logic that the legislature, in doing this, intended to
eliminate the liability. A more definite answer to this problem must await
further action by either the Supreme Court or the Legislature.
Before leaving the subject of the issue price of shares, it should be
noted that other shareholders as well as creditors have an interest in this.
The rights, if any, of persons becoming shareholders after the issuance of
the shares in question are generally measured by the difference between
the par value of such shares and the amount actually paid for them, on the
theory, apparently, that such later shareholders rely on the payment of
the full par value of all previously issued shares when they purchase.10 On
the other hand, the rights of existing shareholders, with respect to the
price of later issues, are generally based on the actual value of the shares
rather than the par value, since a sale below actual value will dilute their
interest regardless of the par value, whereas a sale at less than par will
not injure them in any manner, providing that it is not also below actual
value." There are some instances in which a proposed issue at less than
6,

7.
8.

9.
10.

11.

See Scoville v. Thayer, 105 U.S. 143, 26 L.Ed. 968 (1881) in which the court was
dealing with a Kansas corporation but none-the-less applied the "trust fund theory"
as the equitable doctrine of the United States Supreme Court. The leading case
on the "fraud theory" is Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. and Car Co., 48 Minn. 174,
50 N.W. 1117 (1892) which speaks of putting the liability "upon the ground of fraud,
and applying the old and familiar rules of law upon that subject ....
Stone v. Young, 210 App. Div. 303, 206 N.Y.S. 95 (1924).
Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1931, Section 28-127. The wording of this section was
somewhat ambiguous since it made shareholders liable to creditors "to the amount
of unpaid assessments" and this could logically be construed to include only the
amount remaining unpaid on the contract between the corporation and the shareholder. However, in Tuttle v. Rohrer, 23 Wyo. 305, 149 Pac. 857 (1915) the court
apparently interpreted it to include also the difference between the agreed price
and the par value.
Session Laws of Wyoming 1939, Ch. 62, Section 10. The original provision may be
found in Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1931, Section 28-127.
See Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909) and
The statement to which this note is
the many cases which have followed it.
appended does not correctly summarize the holdings of the Bigelow case since
technically the cause of action under the doctrine is in the corporation for breach
of the promoters' fiduciary duty. But in spite of that it is generally recognized
that the injury is actually to the later purchasers of shares rather than to the
corporation. See Jeff v. Utah Light and Power Co., 136 Me. 454, 12 A. 2d 592 (1940).
Following this reasoning the Utah court in Roberson v. Dranery, 53 Utah 263, 178
Pac. 35 (1918) refused to enforce any liability on the suit of later shareholders when
their stock was worth the amount they paid regardless of the original overvaluation
of the property exchanged for the promoters' shares.
Bodell v. General Gas and Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 119, 132 A. 442 (1926).
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par has been enjoined on the suit of a shareholder where the statute has
expressly prohibited such issues.' 2 Generally speaking, however, the rights
of both subsequent and existing shareholders in this regard have not been
predicated directly on any statutory provisions and the Wyoming Statute
is not, therefore, more inadequate than others in this respect.
MAINTAINING THE CAPITAL MARGIN

The concepts of "stated capital" and "capital surplus," provided for
by the Model Act, have their chief significance in the various roles respecting distributions of corporate assets to shareholders. Although ordinary
dividends constitute the most usual type of such distributions, the term
should also be understood to include the purchase by a corporation of its
own shares, since such shares, when purchased, have no value to the
corporation, and the end result of the transaction, so far as the corporation
is concerned is merely a reduction of its net assets.
With respect to dividends, the Model Act provides that dividends may
not be paid while the corporation is insolvent, or which will render it
insolvent, and may be paid only out of unreserved earned surplus, with
certain exceptions.' 3 Surplus is defined as the excess of net assets over
stated capital, and earned surplus is defined as the portion of surplus equal
to the balance of the net profits, income and gains and loses from the date
of incorporation. 1 4 Many other statutes contain provisions which are
similar in substance although widely varied in form. 15
By comparison, the Wyoming Statute only prohibits the payment of
dividends when the corporation is insolvent or will be made insolvent by
the dividend. On a different question the Wyoming Supreme Court has
held that the impairment of a corporation's capital is not equivalent to
insolvency.' 6 Stated differently, the capital or capital stock is not to be
treated as a liability for the purpose of determining solvency or insolvency
of a corporation. This would seem obvious as a matter of principle, but
confusion none-the-less exists as shown by court opinions and even some
statutory provisions. 7 However, once this is understood it seems clear
12.
13.

Kraft v. Griffin Co., 82 App. Div. 29, 81 N.Y.S. 438
The Model Business Corporation Act, Section 40.

14.

Ibid. Section 2. Stated more simply surplus is the excess of net assets over capital.
The chief difficulties in applying the formula occur in the valuation of various
types of assets. To some extent the accepted accounting procedures for this have
been crystallized into law by court decisions. Thus fixed assets must generally be
carried at cost less depreciation whereas current assets such as raw materials and
inventory must generally be carried at the lower of cost or market value. See
Comment, "The Concept of Surplus as Applicable to Dividends," 2 Wyo. L. J. 114.
The Delaware statute constitutes a notable exception to this generalization in providing that dividends may be paid from surplus or if none such then from the net
profits from the current or preceding year. Revised Code of Del. 1935, Section 1625.
See also the Nevada statute cited in note 17.
Harle-Haas Drug Company v. Rogers Drug Company, 19 Wyo. 35, 113 Pac. 791
(1910).
The Nevada provision on dividends speaks of the surplus of assets over "liabilities
including capital." Nevada Comp. Laws 1929, Section 1625. Similar language may
be found in the court's opinion in Peters v. United States Mfg. Co., 13 Del. Ch. 11,
114 A. 598 (1921).

15.

16.
17.

(1903).
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that there is nothing in the Wyoming statute itself to prohibit a dividend
which leaves the corporation with net assets less than the aggregate par
value of its issued and outstanding shares. The question thus arises as
to whether such a prohibition can be spelled out as a matter of general law.
In Mississippi and Massachusetts, which are among the few jurisdictions
with statutes similar to Wyoming's on this point, the courts have been
able to work out a rule prohibiting dividends which impair capital by the
same line of reasoning which is used to support the requirement for paying
full par on the issuance of shares.18 If net assets equal to the aggregate
par value of the issued and outstanding shares are to be considered a trust
fund for the protection of the corporation's creditors, then any distribution
to stockholders which reduces net assets below this amount is a wrong to
such creditors. But many courts, including the Wyoming court, have refused to accept the trust fund theory in this broad form.' 9 Furthermore,
the 1939 amendment to the statute eliminated an express provision forbidding dividends which impaired capital and, in view of this, it seems
difficult to find any such restriction now by implication. 20
A further obstacle under the Wyoming statute to any rule forbidding
dividends which impair capital is found in the provision for no-par
shares. 21 In the case of par value shares the capital which must be maintained against dividend distributions is determined by computing the total
par value of all issued and outstanding shares, but no such measure is
available for no par shares. The Model Act takes care of this by providing
that the entire consideration received for no par shares shall be credited
to "stated capital" except that the directors may allocate not more than
twenty-five per cent of such consideration to "capital surplus." 22 By
contrast the Wyoming statute is completely silent on the creation of capital
by the issuance of shares. In view of this it seems impossible to spell out
any restriction, short of insolvency, on the payment of dividends, in case
of no-par shares, as it seems that substantially all of the consideration
23
received for such shares could be credited to surplus rather than capital.
As just indicated, surplus as well as capital may be created on the
issuance of no-par shares. Likewise in the case of par value shares surplus
will result when the issue price exceeds the par value. Such surplus is
generally referred to as paid-in surplus, although the Model Act uses the
term "capital surplus" and also includes under this designation surplus
which results from a reduction of capital.2 4 Obviously such surplus is not
18.

Kimbraugh v. Davies, 104 Miss. 722, 61 So. 697 (1913); Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E. 2d 895 (1937).

19.

Harle-Haas Drug Company v. Rogers Drug Company, 19 Wyo. 35, 113 Pac. 791

20.

Session Laws of Wyoming 1939, Ch. 62, Section 12. The previous provision may be
found in Wyoming Revised Statutes 1931, Section 28-131.

21.

Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1945, Section 44-120.

22.
23.

The Model Business Corporation Act, Section 19.
See the discussion of this in Hills, Model Corporation Act, 48 Harv. L. R. 1334 at
pp. 1337-1338.
The Model Corporation Act, Section 63.

(1910).

24.
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the same as earned surplus and it should be treated differently for purposes
of dividends. The Model Act allows the directors to pay cumulative
preferred dividends from capital surplus, but otherwise allows the distribution of such surplus only when authorized by a two-thirds vote of the
25
shareholders and then labels it a distribution in partial liquidation.
However, the directors may use capital surplus to eliminate a deficit and
thereby make subsequent earnings, which would otherwise have to be
applied to the deficit, available for dividends. 28 This provision would seem
to be in derogation of the capital margin theory, or at least to compromise
the position of a capital surplus as a part of the capital margin. The
restrictions on distributing capital surplus are imposed primarily for the
protection of shareholders. Dividends from such surplus may be prejudicial
to shareholders in several ways. In the first place the shareholders theoretically expect to have their investment retained by the corporation and
used in its business rather than returned to them. Secondly, such dividends
may give an untruthful appearance of successful operation, and lastly, the
shareholder may pay federal income tax on what was not income at all
but merely a return of his original investment. More will be said of the
shareholders' rights in this respect in the next section on reducing the capital
margin. So far as the Wyoming law on paid-in surplus is concerned, it
need only be said that since the law makes no provision for establishing a
capital figure, it obviously cannot provide any rules with respect to surplus, paid-in or otherwise.
As previously mentioned, the purchase by a corporation of its own
shares in substance amounts to a distribution to shareholders . It differs
from a dividend in that it is made to one shareholder rather than to all
equally and has the effect of retiring the investment of such shareholder.
Such a purchase will be unfair to other shareholders if the price at which
it is made exceeds the value of the shares because in such event that shareholder will be getting more than his just proportion of the corporate
27
assets. While this proposition has received some judicial recognition it
has not been included in any corporation statute so far as the writer has
been able to determine.
On the other hand, the Model Act and most other modern statutes
contain provisions designed to protect the creditors against impairment
of the capital margin by such purchases. This is accomplished by allowing
the corporation to make such purchases only from earned surplus with
certain limited exceptions. 28 A similar rule can be worked out from the
provisions found in some of the older statutes which prohibit in general
terms any distributions to shareholders which impair capital.29 But ob25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Ibid., Section 41.
The Model Corporation Act, Section 63.
See the dissenting opinion of Epes, J. in Grace Securities Corporation v. Roberts,
158 Va. 792, 164 S.E. 700 (1932). Dictum to the same effect may be found in Laue
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 243 App. Div. 57, 276 N.Y.S. 173 (1934).
The Model Business Corporation Act, Section 5.
Ashman v. Miller, 101 F. 2d 85 (CCA 6 1939); Compare Schulte v. Boulevard
Gardens Land Co., 164 Cal. 464, 129 Pac. 582 (1913).
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viously no such rule can be spelled out under the Wyoming statute since
it gives no recognition to the concept of legal or stated capital.30
Some of the older cases took an entirely different approach to this
question and held that the purchase by a corporation of its own shares
was prohibited by the doctrine of ultra vires.31 This, of course, amounts
to a flat prohibition of such purchases under any circumstances and without regard to the financial condition of the corporation. This rule has
been justly criticized on the ground that the doctrine of ultra vires pertains
only to the business being carried on by the corporation and not to the
management of its internal financial affairs.3 2 But in any event such a
rule would not seem possible in Wyoming since the 1939 amendment which
repealed the express prohibition of such purchases previously included in
the statute.3 3
In the interest of completeness it should be noted that certain exceptions have generally been recognized to the rules pr9 hibiting or restricting
the purchase of treasury shares. As codified by the Model Act these include
purchases made to eliminate fractional shares, collect indebtedness, pay
dissenting shareholders in reorganizations, and to effect the retirement of
34
redeemable shares.
REDUCING THE CAPITAL MARGIN

In one sense, anytime the net assets of a corporation fall below the

aggregate par value of its issued and outstanding shares through unfavorable business operations, the capital has been reduced. This, however, is
generally referred to as an impairment of capital and the term "reduction
of capital" is used to describe a reduction .of the capital figures or stated
capital. Such a reduction does not in itself, involve any reduction in net
assets. However, it may be followed by a distribution of the surplus which
will result from any such reduction of capital which exceeds in amount the
amount of any prior deficit. As a matter of mechanics such a reduction may
be accomplished in a number of different ways; some of which necessarily
involve distributions in partial liquidation and others of which do not.
The Model Act contains a number of sections, designed for the protection
of creditors and shareholders, governing these various methods of reducing
capital.
The general provisions for a reduction of capital under the Model Act
are included in Section 62 which provides that, in cases where the proposed
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.

It is interesting to note that in Massachusetts, which has a statute similar to Wyoing's in prohibiting dividends only in the event of insolvency, a corporation is
permitted to purchase its own shares even though it amounts to reduction of capital.
Scriggins v. Thomas Dalby Co., 290 Mass. 414, 195 N.E. 749 (1935). This, of course,
is not consistent with the judge-made rule on dividends. Note 17 supra.
Darnell-Love Lumber Co. v. Wiggs, 144 Tenn. 113, 230 S.W. 391 (1921).
Ballantine on Corporations, 1946, Section 356a.
Session Laws of Wyoming, 1939, Ch. 62, Section 6. The original provision may be
found in Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1931, Section 28-122.
The Model Corporation Act, Section 5.
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reduction does not require an amendment of the articles or the cancellation of shares, the reduction can be accomplished by the affirmative vote
of a majority of the shares entitled to vote. The plan for reduction is to
be proposed by a resolution of the directors, and a statement concerning
the reduction must be filed with an appropriate state official. Under
these provisions a reduction of capital can be accomplished if the corporation has no par shares or, in the case of par value shares, if the total stated
capital exceeds the aggregate par value of the issued shares. Also a reduction of capital under this section could be effected by reducing the number
of issued and outstanding shares. If the reduction is to be accomplished by
reducing the par value of the issued shares or by changing such shares from
par value to no par value, then it is necessary to proceed under the provisions for amending the articles. 35 The principal substantive difference
between these sections and the one just described is the requirement for a
two-thirds vote to amend the articles rather than the simple majority required for a reduction of capital without amendment. Reduction of capital
by the cancellation of treasury shares or the redemption of redeemable
shares will be considered later.
As mentioned previously the reduction of capital, in itself, does not
result in any reduction of net assets. However, unless the reduction of
capital is made for the purpose of eliminating a deficit it will normally be
followed by a distribution to the shareholders. Such distributions are
accurately designated by the Model Act as "Distributions in Partial Liquidation."3 6 The Act provides that such distributions may be made either
from stated capital or from capital surplus, but it would seem that stated
capital should be available for this purpose only to the extent that the
distribution is accompanied by a reduction of capital. A further section
of the Act provides that all surplus created by a reduction of capital is to
be deemed capital surplus.3

7

The interests of the corporation's creditors

in this are protected by the Act only to the extent that it forbids such
distributions when the corporation is insolvent or when the corporation
will be made insolvent by the distribution. While this might be considered an abandonment of the capital margin theory it is no more so
than the rule which permits the corporation to begin business in the
first place without a substantial amount of capital paid in. On the other
hand the Act gives considerable recognition to the shareholders' rights in
this respect. In the first place such a distribution may be made only with
the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the shares of each class entitled to
vote. Secondly, no such distribution may be made on any class of shares
unless the cumulative dividends on all prior classes are fully paid, nor may
any such distribution be made on any class of shares if it will reduce the
35.

36.
37.

Ibid. Section 53 through 58.

Ibid., Section 41.
Ibid., Section 63.
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net assets below the total liquidation preferences of all shares having
equal or prior rank.38
The provisions of the Model Act concerning the reduction of capital
by the cancellation of reacquired shares are somewhat confusing. Even
at the risk of departing somewhat from the general theme of this paper it
seems desirable to explore these difficulties in some detail, since it is matter
that should be given thought in any state considering the adoption of legislation patterned after the Model Act. As noted in the previous section,
the Act permits the purchase of treasury shares only from earned surplus.
Such a purchase, then, would seem to result in a reduction of earned surplus but no reduction in capital. A further section provides for the cancellation of such shares by resolution of the directors and requires that a
statement concerning the cancellation be filed with the appropriate state
official.3 9 The cancellation would appear to be the stage at which the reduction of capital occurs, 40 but doubt is cast on this by a still further provision.
Section 63 provides that the surplus created by a reduction of capital shall
be deemed capital surplus, but goes on to state that where such reduction
is accomplished by the cancellation of treasury shares, such surplus shall
only be created to the extent that the stated capital represented by such
shares exceeded the cost of such shares to the corporation. This latter
restriction can only be complied with if some reduction in capital occurred
on the acquisition of the shares by the corporation. The section was undoubtedly drafted in the light of the common accounting practice with
reference to treasury shares, which in fact shows a reduction of capital to
the extent of the par value of such sha-es and then "restricts" earned surplus to the same amount. The effect of the restriction, of course, is to
make such surplus unavailable for dividends or further purchases of treasury
shares until the restriction is removed. Although the Act recognizes the
concept of restricted surplus, 41 it makes no provision fox the manner in

which the restriction is to be removed in these circumstances. Presumably
the restriction disappears when the shares are cancelled. The effect of
the cancellation of treasury shares, then, is to create earned surplus rather
than capital surplus, and such surplus will be available for distribution as
dividends or for the purchase of more treasury shares without complying
with the requirements established for distributions in partial liquidation.
This, of course, is clearly contrary to the principles controlling the distribution of surplus resulting from other methods of capital reduction.
The Act also provides for a reduction of capital by the purchase or
redemption of redeemable preferred shares. 42 Such shares are cancelled
automatically upon redemption or purchase, and thereupon revert to the
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Ibid., Section 62.
Ibid., Section 61.
As a matter of fact, this is expressly stated in the Act, Section 61.
Section 63 provides that reserves may be created from earned surplus and that such
surplus shall be restricted to such extent. This, of course, is a different type of
restriction than we are concerned with here but the effect is the same.
Ibid., Section 60.
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status of authorized but unissued shares unless the articles provide that
such shares may not be reissued. In keeping with the theory that redeemable shares do not form a permanent part of the capital structure the Act
only forbids their redemption when the corporation would be rendered
insolvent or the net assets would be reduced below the aggregate liquidation preferences of shares with prior or equal liquidation rights. 4 3 There
is no restriction that such shares may be redeemed only from surplus.
Turning now to the Wyoming Statute we find only one provision
relating to the reduction of capital and it is rather ambiguous to say the
least. Section 44-131 provides that a corporation may "increase or diminish
its capital stock by complying with the provisions of this article, to any
amount which may be deemed sufficient and proper for the purposes of
the corporation. . . ." Succeeding sections then specify the procedure for
making such change, requiring among other things a two-thirds vote of
the shareholders and the filing of a certificate of such action with the
Secretary of State. All of these sections taken together raise a considerable
question as to whether they refer to increasing or reducing the capital
amount, as we have been considering it or, on the other hand, to changing
the authorized capital as provided for by the certificate of incorporation.
In favor of the latter construction it may be noted that these same
sections authorize other changes, such as changing the name of the corporation, or the nature of its business, which in effect amount to amendments
of the certificate of incorporation. There is no other provision of the
statute which authorizes such amendments. Furthermore, it would not be
possible to increase the capital, in the sense we have been considering the
term, merely by such action. Somebody has to purchase the shares and
pay for them. On the other hand, the authorized capital may be increased
or reduced by an amendment of the certificate.
In favor of the opposite conclusion it might be contended that the
proviso limiting the reduction of capital to an amount sufficient for the
business of the corporation indicates that the legislature had in mind the
actual capital resulting from the issuance of shares. But in view of the
fact that the statute does not require any particular amount of capital to be
paid in on the organization of a corporation, the proviso seems meaningless
even when so construed. Section 44-134 requires that the certificate to be
filed in connection with the change must state the "amount of capital
actually paid in . . . ." This clearly indicates that the provision was
intended to cover a reduction in capital, not merely a reduction in authorized capital. But viewing the statute as a whole this provision seems somewhat meaningless too. At one time the statute required the filing of a
certificate showing the amount of capital stock originally paid in, but this
provision was repealed by the 1939 amendment, and in view of this, there
43.

Ibid.. Section 59.
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to serve by requiring a filing in connection
does not seem to be any purpose
44
capital.
of
with a reduction
By way of conclusion, it can only be said that the Wyoming statute is
completely inadequate in providing means for the reduction of capital. In
the absence of express statutory authorization, such as that found in the
Model Act for example, it is at least arguable that no such reduction can
be made which will operate to change the interest of any shareholder
without his consent.
CRITI CAL EVALUATION

Probably the most serious charge that can be made against the Wyoming Statute is that it makes for uncertainty. To a large extent this uncertainty is due to the fact that the statute does not contain answers to
questions which are customarily governed by express statutory provisions.
The result is that such questions for the most part must remain completely
up in the air unless and until the Wyoming Supreme Court gives an answer,
since there is no general .common law of corporations on which to fall
back in the absence of statute. On the other hand there is 'a considerable
amount of uniformity among corporation statutes (the Wyoming statute
excepted, of course), and the temptation is strong to assume the same answer to a given question in Wyoming, where there is no applicable statute,
as is reached in almost every other state by express statutory provisions.
But such a process involves considerable danger because it is possible
that the legislature had quite revolutionary motives in enacting the 1939
amendments.
Taken altogether the various changes made by this amendment seem
to represent a conscious effort to abolish the capital margin concept in toto.
Thus there is no requirement for an original margin of paid-in capital nor
is there any rule against impairing such capital margin by distributions to
shareholders. It would seem to follow that there is consequently no need
to regulate the reduction of such capital margin, although the absence of
statutory provisions on this last matter is apt to be construed as a complete lack of authorization to make such reductions rather than as a grant
of complete license with respect to them.
As a matter of legal principle, this abandonment of the capital margin
requirement cannot be greatly criticized. Under the provisions of modern
statutes the capital margin requirements do not provide any siginificant
protection for the creditors of a corporation for the simple reason that they
45
It
do not require any substantial minimum of original paid-in capital.
is doubtful that any satisfactory requirement of that sort can be worked
44.
45.

Session Laws of Wyoming, 1939, Ch. 62, Section 11. The original provision may be
found in Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 1939, Section 28-130.
The Model Act, Section 51, provides that before the corporation can begin business
there must have been paid for the issuance of shares consideration of the value of
at least one thousand dollars.
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out. Obviously the amount of capital necessary in any particular case will
depend largely on the size and nature of the business to be conducted. It
has been suggested, as a substitute for capital requirements, that corporations be required to retain a certain ratio of assets over liabilities. 46 But
even such a provision would seem too inflexible to work fairly in all
situations. In the last analysis there is probably nothing wrong with putting
the burden on the creditor to determine, in each instance, if the resources
of the corporation are sufficient to merit the contemplated credit.
But even if this is conceded it may still be argued that, however inadequate the original capital margin might have been, the creditors should
be protected in that amount against distributions to the shareholders. This
argument, of course, applies only in favor of creditors becoming such
prior to the distribution. When so limited the idea appears to be simply
a large extension of the rule of fraudulent conveyances which makes void
as to creditors any voluntary transfer by an insolvent. Considering .the
question in this light, it is hard to justify such a discrimination against
corporate debtors. Furthermore, the argument loses its validity entirely
when we remember that under most of the modern statutes, of which the
Model Act is a fair sample, the capital margin can be reduced to a nominal
amount by stockholder action and without any regard to the rights of
existing creditors.
The above discussion is not intended to demonstrate that the Wyoming
statute is the best possible corporation law, or even that it is superior to
the Model Act and similar statutes. In the writer's opinion, quite the
contrary is true. In general, there is much to be gained by following
convention unless some good reason suggests itself for not doing so. Wyoming lawyers could work with more assurance, and with greater benefit
from the decisions and practices of other states, if the Wyoming statute
conformed more nearly to the prevailing form. On many of these questions,
it is of principal importance that there be a clear and definite rule. The
substance of the rule is unimportant by comparison.
Furthermore, even though the modern version of the capital margin
concept is of little value in protecting creditors of corporations, it does
serve to protect certain legitimate interests of shareholders. For example,
each is entitled to some assurance that he has received a fair proportionate
interest in the corporation on the basis of his investment. Likewise, the
shareholder is entitled to have his investment retained in the corporation
and used in the conduct of the business until the shareholders as a body
46.

See Ballantine and Hills, "Corporate Capital and Restrictions on Dividends Under
Modem Corporation Laws," 23 Calif. L. R. 229. at P. 262. Prior to 1939 the
Wyoming statute contained a completely ambiguous provision that was probably
intended to express some such restriction. It provided that the indebtedness of the
company should not exceed its capital stock. See Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1931, section
28-132. This may have required a ratio of assets over liabilities of two to one although it is difficult to determine what purpose was intended to be served by
measuring liabilities against capital. But in any event the section has been repealed. Wyoming Session Laws 1939, Ch. 62, Section 13.
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determine, in accordance with the original agreement, that a part or all
of it should be returned. Furthermore, the shareholder should be protected against the false appearance of prosperity which results from a
return of invested capital in the guise of ordinary dividends.
Enough has been said, it would seem, to show that Wyoming is badly
in need of a new corporation law. The easiest solution, and on the whole
probably the most satisfactory, would be a law patterned after the Model
Act or one of the other comprehensive statutes which have recently been
adopted in a number of states. But if the Bar and the business community
wish to assume a pioneering role with an even more liberal law which
completely disregards the capital margin concept, then the statute should
at least provide definite answers to the following questions: 1) What obligations, if any, does a shareholder owe to creditors and to other shareholders
with respect to the amount and kind of consideration paid for his shares?
2) What rights, if any, do creditors and shareholders have to insist that
the invested capital, or some specified part thereof, be retained in the business rather than returned to the shareholders in the form of dividends or
purchases of treasury shares? 3) Assuming an affirmative answer to the
last question, then what obligation does the corporation have to restore
a prior loss of such invested capital from earnings rather than using such
earnings for dividends? 4)Again assuming an affirmative answer to the
second question, what means are available to the corporation and the
shareholders to reduce the amount of capital that must be retained as
against distributions to shareholders and what rights, if any, do the creditars of the corporation have with respect to such reductions? If a negative
answer is intended for any or all of the questions, then it is necessary, in
order to avoid hopeless uncertainty, that the statute should clearly express
such intention.

